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. Abstract 
This paper considers an entrepreneur who potentially sets up a monopolistic firm 
but faces the risk of a demand shock. The entrepreneur has two possible choices for 
financing: he can use the capital good component of his production as collateral for a 
low interest secured loan or he can obtain funds through an unsecured loan that 
does not require collateral· but charges a high interest rate. Through his cost 
minimizatiop. problem, the choice of financial contracts determines the marginal 
costs of production and the inputs of factors of production. The entrepreneur's 
choice of financial loan, therefore, has a significant effect on the output market and 
. may be detrimental to social welfare in some cases. 
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1 Introduction 
Entrepreneurs who do not have enough funds to set up a firm must raise funds 
from a financial institution or capital investor. Berger and Udell (1998) investigate 
the relationship between the financial growth cycle of firms and the resources 
available for financing. Their study finds that small and medium-size enterprises 
(SMEs), which have a potential for growth but a limited track record, obtain 
financing from private equity and debt markets (for example, angel finance and 
venture capital) or loans from financial institutions (banks) rather than from public 
markets (public equity and commercial paper markets). Why do some start-up firms 
raise funds from banks and others from venture capital? Financial transactions are 
usually associated with asymmetric information and uncertainty. In particular, 
asymmetric information is a serious problem for young firms that have a limited 
track record. It is well known that the existence of various types of financial 
contracts and transactions reduce· problems stemming from asymmetric 
information between the borrower and lender. A number of studies have 
investigated the types of financing available to entrepreneurs and SMEs from the 
standpoint' of the asymmetric information literature: Veda (2004), Dessi (2005), 
Order (2006), Inderst et.al. (2007), Hvide and Leite (2008), and Winton and 
Yerramilli (2008). 
In contrast, our paper considers different types of financial transactions with a 
focus on the risk management of financial institution; the essential difference 
between bank finance and venture capital, or angel finance, is the attitude toward 
risk. Banks usually avoid taking risk and typically demand collateral with a loan. l 
On the . other hand, venture capitalists take a share of ownership in the SME 
through equity participation or capital subscription. Venture capitalists earn profit 
through the sale of equity after the SME has achieved success; venture capital is 
rewarded for taking risk. Focusing on the difference between bank finance and 
venture capital, our model explores two typ'es of financial contract: a secured loan 
with guaranteed collateral and an unsecured loan. 
In this paper, we consider how the existence of two types of financial constraint 
1 Contracts guaranteed with collateral have mainly been studied in the context of 
asymmetric information and incentive problems. It is well known that the inefficiency 
stemming from asymmetric information in financial transactions is improved by a 
self-selection mechanism through the choice of financial contract (Bester 1985). 
Collateral also reduces moral hazard by influencing the borrower's incentive (Boot et. al. 
1991, Bester 1994 Berger and Udell 1998). In addition, the lender can save monitoring 
costs with contracts backed by collateral. For example, Rajan and Winston (1995) show 
that banks always demand collateral without monitoring. 
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affects the behavior of the entrepreneur as borrower of funds and the output market 
where the entrepreneur sells his ·product. If the bank demands collateral with a 
loan, the entrepreneur faces a borrowing constraint that limits the size of the loan 
to the value of the collateral. In many cases the asset that the entrepreneur 
provides as collateral is the equipment and infrastructure required for production, 
for example, real estate as building of factory or office, automobiles, and/or 
machinery. Suppose a standard production technology that requires capital goods 
and labor as inputs. Only capital goods can be used as collateral for a loan. If the 
entrepreneur expands the' scale o(production, he must increase the value of the 
collateral. This implies that increasing the input of capital goods alone leads to a 
distortion in factor inputs although a secured loan· that is guaranteed with 
collateral generally demands a low interest rate. On the other hand, because 
venture capital takes a.large risk when financing the entrepreneur's business, the 
promised rate of return for venture capital must reflect a risk premium. The high 
rate of return implies a large burden cof interest payments for the en,trepreneur. 
Through the cost minimization problem of the entrepreneur, the high interest rate 
pushes up the entrepreneur's marginal costs of production. Therefore, the choice of 
financiai contract changes the cost function of the entrepreneur and should 
significantly influence the output market. 
This paper assumes an entrepreneur who potentially sets up a monopolistic firm 
but faces the risk of a demand shock.2 We study the effect of different financial 
contracts on the output market and social welfare through the behavior of the 
entrepreneur. We show that characteristic features for the product technology and 
the market, i.e., capital intensity, market size and risk of a demand shock, crucially 
affect the entrepreneur's choice of financial contract. We conclude that while an 
entrepreneur with a large market prefers an unsecured loan, and an entrepreneur 
who faces a large risk of a demand shock prefers a secured loan backed with 
collateral.3 Moreover; we show that the entrepreneur's choice of financial loan may 
be undesirable for consumers. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the basic 
set-up of the economy. Section 3 derives cost functions for the entrepreneur under 
2 Similar to our model, there exists a literature that analyzes the interaction between 
the financing activities offirms and imperfect competitive output markets, for instance, 
Brander and Lewis (1986), Fulghieri and Nagarajan (1992), and Glazer (1994). Chapter 
7 of Tirol (2006) provides a survey of this literature. 
3 The letter result is consistent with Berger and Udell (1990)'s empirical finding and 
the result of Chen (2006) although this considers asymmetric information problem. 
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each type of financial contract. Section 4 shows equilibrium in the output market 
and the entrepreneur's optimal choice of financial contract, and considers social 
I " 
welfare. Section 5 summarizes the conclusions ofthis paper. 
2 Basic Set-up 
Consider an entrepreneur who has invented a new good and potentially sets up a 
monopolistic firm. When the entrepreneur starts his bUf;iness, the market size is 
uncertain, he faces the risk ofthe demand shock, and because production takes time, 
he must set up his firm before the market size is determined. There are two factors 
of production, capital goods and labor. However, as production takes time and 
revenue is zero until the product is sold, the entrepreneur needs operating funds to 
hire the capital and labor required for I?roduction. While he has some personal 
funds, these are not sufficient to cover all operating costs. Thus, the entrepreneur 
must borrow funds from a financial institution. There are two types of loans. Under 
the first type, the entrepreneur uses capital goods as collateral for a low interest 
secured loan. Under the second type he obtain funds through an unsecured loan 
that does not require collateral but charges a higher interest rate than the secured 
loan. We respectively call the former loan type" contract C and the latter contract N 
The inverse demand function ofthe output marketis given as 
P=A-x, (1) 
where P and x are respectively price and quantity. A represents market size 
and is a probability variable that reflects a demand shock,; During productionA 
becomes a with probability p or zero with probability 1- p . 
The entrepreneur has the following production technology: 
where k and I, respectively, represent the capital good and labor. For simplicity, 
we assume that the value of the capital good is zero once production is finished. The 
operating funds required to obtain the capital good and employ labor are 
C = k+wl, (3) 
where the capital good is set as the model numeraire and w is the wage. 
The entrepreneur finances operating funds using personal funds and a loan 
obtained from a financial institution under either contract C or contract N. 
Therefore, we have C = bi + f ,where bi U = C, N) denotes borrowed funds with 
the subscript indicating the type of financial contract, and f denotes personal 
funds. 
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From (3), the borrowing requirement for the entrepreneur is 
b; = k; + wi; - f . 
There are number of identical financial institutions from which the entrepreneur 
can obtaIn a loan. Because of ~ompetition among financial institutions, the profit 
that financial institutions earn from loans is zero and financial institutions offer 
identical contracts in equilibrium. While contract N does not require any collateral 
for the loan, there is a collateral requirement for contract C that limits the value of 
funds the entrepreneur can borrow· to the value of the collateral. We assume that 
before the firm is established the entrepreneur has no assets, other than his 
personal funds, that the financial institution will accept as collatera1.4 Of course, 
labor cannot be used· as collateral, and therefore, if the entrepreneur chooses 
contract C, he must collateralize his capital goods. When the entrepreneur enters 
contract C, he faces the borrowing constraint: 
be ~ tSckc · (5) 
Note that capital good is the numeraire. tSc E (0,1] is the loan-to-value ratio, which 
will be determined by the depreciation of the capital good, and the creditor's cost of 
repossessing the collateral and selling the associated capital good. 
The entrepreneur faces a demand shock, i.e., if the probability variable A equals " 
zero, the revenue of the firm is zero even once production has been completed. When 
A = ° occurs, the entrepreneur has no incentive to continue production, and as the 
entrepreneur pays wages before the market size A is known, the only asset the 
financial institution can claim is the capital good. Therefore, when the market size 
associated with a contract is zero, the financial institution forces the· entrepreneur 
to cease production activity and seizes the capital goods, regardless of whether the 
financial contract is secured or not. In the case of contract C, because the financial 
institution acquires the collateral, the contract is risk-free for the financial 
institution. For simplicity, we assume that the interest rate of the risk-free asset is 
zero, so the interest rate on contract C equals zero, i.e., rc = 0. Similarly, it 
financial institution that enters contraCt N can also seize the capital goods. 
Considering the cost of seizing and reselling the capital good, the collectable value is 
tSNkN' where tSN E (0,1). Because contract N is not secured with collateral, however, 
the financial institution will incur additional legal costs over and above the costs 
associated with contract C. Therefore, we assume that 
tSN < tSc · (6) 
4 Our results hold if we assume that the entrepreneur has another bankable asset. For 
detail, see footnote 6. 
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For simplicity, t5c = 1 is assumed for the remainder ofthe paper. In appendix A, the 
assumption of t5c = 1 does not lead to qualitative difference from the general case 
of t5c ~ 1. 
With contract N, it is possible that the debt ofthe entrepreneur exceeds the value 
of collectable capital goods, i.e., t5N bN > k N . When A=O, the fmancial institution 
cannot collect the full principal of the loan and must incur a loss. In equilibrium, 
from the no-arbitrage condition, the expected return on contract N must equal the 
return on investment in a-safe asset. Thus, the interest rate of contract N, rN , is 
determined by the following no arbitrage condition: 
p(1 + rN )bN + (1- P)t5N k N = bN , 
where the right-hand side (R.,R.S) represents the return on a safe investment (the 
interest rate for safe assets is zero). The second term of left-hand side (L.R.S'> 
represents the expected value of the seized capital good when A=O. From (7), we 
have t5N bN > kN ¢:> rN > 0; the interest rate of contract N is greater than that of the 
safe asset due to the risk premium. 
For financial institutions, the difference between each type of contract is the 
method used to manage risk. When A = 0 is realized, the financial institution 
seizes the capital good, and for contract C, the financial institution manages default 
risk using collateral. For contract N, on the other hand, the financial institution 
incurs a loss with A = 0, but obtains high interest revenue with A = a; the 
financial institution manages risk by.charging a risk premium on the loan. In an 
effective financial market, the financial institution's expected, profit from contract N 
is zero. 
(Figure 1 is around here.> 
Figure 1 describes the profits of the entrepreneur an~the order of events. Before. 
the productive activity, financial institutions offer an interest rate of r N for 
contract N and the entrepreneur decides whether to enter into contract N or 
contract C. The entrepreneur then purchases capital goods and employs labor using 
operating funds that have been fmanced using personal funds fand a loan b;. If 
A = a is realized,· the. entrepreneur obtains revenue p. x; and repays the 
principal and interest,· (1 + r; )b;, to the financial institution. After production, the 
value of the capital good is zero. In this case, the profit of the entrepreneur is 
1l; = p. x; - (1 + r; )b;. Alternatively, if A = 0, the _ output market disappears, the 
entrepreneur has profit of zero and is bankrupt. Therefore, the entrepreneur's 
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expected profit is E7!; = p. 7!; . In order to guarantee an incentive for the 
entrepreneur to establish a firm, at least one of following participation constraints 
must be satisfied: 
p7! N ~ f or p7! c ~ f . (8) 
3 Cost Functions under Financial Contracts 
We consider the cost minimization problem of the entrepreneur for each type of 
financial contract. As production costs are financed using borrowed and personal 
funds, the entrepreneur's total cost TC; equals the repayment of the principal and 
interest. From (4), we have 
TC; = (1 + rJb;, = (1 + r;)k; + (1 + r;)wl; - (1 + r;)f. (9) 
If the entrepreneur has a small amount of personal funds, he must borrow a large 
amount offunds from a financial institution, which leads to large interest payments. 
The third term of the R.H.S. represents the opportunity benefit of personal funds, 
which is the benefit from reduced interest payment due to the use of personal funds. 
First, we consider contract C. The entrepreneur faces the borrowing constraint (5) 
and using (4), and Oc = 1, this borrowing constraint can be rewritten as 
w·le ~ f· (10) 
When the borrowing constraint is binding, (10) implies that all wages are paid from 
the entrepreneur's personal funds. In other words, all capital goods are purchased 
using a. loan from a financial institution and then the capital good is pledged as 
collateral. 5 6 Under the borrowing constraint (10) and the technology (2), the 
entrepreneur minimizes (9). Given that rc = 0, the cost minimization problem is 
min{kc +wlc - f} 
kc,lc 
k 0'1 1-0' s1. Xc = c c . 
w·Ze ~f 
5 For example, suppose that the entrepreneur purchases machines and infrastructure 
for his factory or office using a mortgage from a banle Of cause, this property comes 
from the assumption of Oc = 1. In the general case of Oc E (0,1), the rewritten 
borrowing constraint is given by (A. I) in appendix A. 
6 As mentioned in footnote 4, suppose the entrepreneur has a bankable asset, for 
example real estate as his house. :Qefine the value of the additional asset as h. In this 
case, the participation constraints (8) are rewritten as p7!c ~ f + h, (5) is replaced by 
be ~ 0eke + h , and (10) becomes w ·le ~ f + h . Because these changes are the same' 
as an increase in f, they do not qualitatively affect our results. 
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For the entrepreneur with has large amou:nt of personal funds 
constraint (10) is not binding, and the cost function is 
7'''' _ -cr (1 )-(I-cr) I-cr j 
.LL--cr -cr W x- . 
j, the borrowing 
(11) 
From the cost minimization problem, we derive the condition under which the 
borrowing constraint (10) binds as follows; 
x ?' xc' with Xc == (~)w -(I-cr) j . 
1- cr 
This condition implies that an entrepreneur who plans for a large production scale 
relative to his available personal funds faces a borrowing 'constraint due to a large 
loan requirement. If (12) is satisfied, the capital good and labor input are 
determined by two constraints (2) and (10), and the total cost function under 
contract C is 
(13) 
From (13), the marginal cost under contract C is an increasing function due to cr < 1. 
From the borrowing constraint (10), the entrepreneur who chooses contract C pays 
wages from his personal funds. Thus, in order to expand the level of production, he 
must increase the input. capital goods because the labor input is fixed. That is, the 
expansion of production leads to a distortion in factdr inputs. 
Next, we consider contract N. When the entrepreneur chooses contract N with 
interest rate rN , the cost minimization problem is as follows: 
. k crz I-cr· 
s1. xN = N N 
From (7), rN ~ 0 holds if and only if bN ~ 5NkN . From (4), the condition is rewritten 
as 
. 
If inequality (14) is violated, the entrepreneur minimizes TC N = k + w/- j subject 
to (2). In this case, the cost function is same as (11) because rN = o. Factor demand 
functions for capital goods and labor are respectively k = cr l - cr (1- cr) -(l-cr) w l- cr x and 
/ = cr-cr (1- cr)cr w-cr x . Substituting these factor demand fu~ctions into (14), we have 
> - = cr(l_ )1-cr(I_S: )-1 -(I-cr)j X-XN -cr cr cruN W . (15) 
Note that xN < xc. If (15) holds, l.e., rN ~ 0, the no arbitrage condition (7) is 
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rewritten as (1 + rN) = p-I ~ - (1- p)5NkNbN-I) Substituting this into (9), the total 
cost is rewritten as TCN = p-I [{1- (1- p)5N }kN + wiN - f]. hi the case, the cost 
minimization problem is given as follows; 
. k 171 I-a 
s.t. XN = N N 
Therefore, the cost function for contract N is 
TCN=(1-(1-p)5N)aWI-aXN_f if ~ 
l' , XN <XN. pO-a (1- a) I-a p (16) 
(1- (1- p)5N )a wi-a From (16), the marginal cost IS constant as under the po-a (1- o-y-a r 
Cobb-Douglas technology. 
Therefore, the entrepreneur who can choose the type of financial contract faces 
the following cost function. 
Proposition 1 
(13) and (16) indicate a threshold x; TCe <TCN ifxN <x<X; while TCN <TCe 
if x < x . That is, the entrepreneur faces the following cost function: 
0--17 (1- ay(l-a) wi-a X - f . 
I-a I 
TC = (wi f)-;;- Xc; ,if Xc <x<x. (17) 
Proof. See Appendix B. 
(Figure 2 is around here.) 
Figure 2 shows the cost functions (17). If the production level is smaller than xN ' 
a loan to the entrepreneur does not involve any risk for the financial institutions, 
the entrepreneur does not face a borrowing constraint and the interest rate is zero. 
Thus, the entrepreneur is indifferent between the type of financial contract and the 
cost function is given by (11). This case is not interesting as we would like to focus 
on the difference between the cost functions associated with each type of contract. 
Hence, we assume (12). 
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4 Equilibrium 
In this section we derive the market equilibrium. First, given contracts Nand C, 
we derive the output and expected profit of the entrepreneur. The entrepreneur 
chooses the contract that generates larger expected profit. If A=O, his firm goes 
bankrupt and his profit is zero. Therefore, from (1), the expected profit under each 
contract is 
E7i; = p{Ca-x;)x; -(1+r;)b;}+(1-p)xO. (18) 
Now we define the tie-break rule. That is, if the expect profits from each contract 
are the same, we assume that the entrepreneur chooses contract C. Thus, he 
equilibrium output of the firm. From' (18), this inequality is equivalent to 
7iNCXN*) > 7ic (xc*) , so, for simplicity, we consider the profit maximization problem 
using definite value rather than expected value. 
We consider the entrepreneur's optimal output under each financial contract. 
From the inverse demand function (1), the marginal revenue is MR = a - 2x . From 
marginal costs under 'each contract are respectively 
1-0' 
MCN=O'"-O'(1-O")-(I~O')(l+rN)wl-O' and MCc = ~(1+rc{;)~ /:0' . From the 
first order condition for profit maximization, MR = MC , the entrepreneur's optimal 
output x; * (i = N, C) must satisfy the following conditions:7 
(19) 
(20) 
From (19) and (20), we have the equilibrium outputs XN* =XN*C~,O",W,P,ON) and 
Xc * = Xc *ca,O", w,j). In addition, from (19) and (20), we have the entrepreneur's 
profit functions as follows: 
7 The second order conditions for profit maximization are satisfied. 
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* *. *2 f 
JrN = PXN -TCN = (XN ) +-, p 
(21) . 
(22) 
The entrepreneur compares the profits of (21) to (22) and chooseE;; the financial 
contract which guarantee the largest expected profit. 
Here, we analyze the properties of the optimal financial contract for the 
entrepreneur. Figure 3 and 4 provide these market equilibria. MC Nand MCc 
have an intersection at 
ME is a negatively sloped straight line and shifts vertically with changes in a. We 
define a as the market size for which ME passes through the intersection of 
MCN and MCc : 
Figures 3 and 4 respectively show the cases of a < a and a > Ci. From these 
figures and (24), we have the following relationship between the optimal outputs 
Xi' and the market size a. 
(Figure 3 and 4 are around here.) 
Proposition 2 
• 8a 8a 





The marginal cost function associated with contract N is horizontal while the 
marginal cost for contract C is upward ·sloping. Thus, the optimal financial contract 
for the entrepreneur depends on the market size a. Moreovet, a large risk of 
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demand shock (small p), andhirge costs for the seizure and resale of the capital 
good in contract N (large bN ) raise the interest rate of contract N, rN . Thus, a 
decrease in p and an increase in bN push up the marginal cost of contract N, and 
then expand the region where the contract N is undesirable for the entrepreneur. 
On the other hand, a large amount of personal funds (large f) loosens the 
borrowing constraint'and reduces the marginal cost of contract C. 
From the inverse demand function (1), the consumer surplus when A = 0 IS 
given by eSj = !(Xj*)2 . Therefore, we have the following proposition. 2 . 
Proposition 3 
If a < a (a> ex), eSN < esc (eSN > esc) holds. 
Under the given production technology (2), we cannot solve for the equilibrium 
output explicitly. But, Proposition 2 gives conditions that determine which type of 
financial contract is desirable for consumers in the monopolistic market. A large 
level of production l~ads to a large consumer surplus. Thus, the desirable financial 
contract for consumers depends on market size. 
On the other hand, large output does not always lead to large profit. We define 
the difference between (21) and (22) as 
l 1-0" J - 1-0" * *. * 2 • 1-0" W 0" * - * f G=JrN -Jrc =(xN ) - Xc +--;;-(l+rc{fJ (xc)O" Xc + p' (25) 
From (25) and ,Proposition 3, we·have the following result. 
Proposition 4 
If G > 0 (G::; 0), the entrepreneur selects contract N (contract C). However, the 
choice of the entrepreneur is not always desirable for consumers. 
From (25), the entrepreneur's choice does necessarily maximize the consumer 
surplus for the following two reasons: (j) the difference between the marginal cost 
functions and (ll) the different signs for the constant terms ofthe cost function (17). 
If the cost functions have no constant terms and both marginal cost functions are 
horizontal, then the profit function for each financial contract is (Xj*)2 Ci = e,N). 
In this case, the financial contract with higher profit leads to larger consumer 
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surplus in the second best economy. But, this is not true in general because of the 
difference in the shapes of the cost functions. As the producer surplus equals total 
revenue minus variable cost, it can be rewritten as profit plus the constant term of 
r 
the cost function. 8 That is, the difference between the first and second terms in (25) 
indicates the difference between the producer surpluses of contracts Nand C. In 
Figures 3 and 4, the producer surplus of contract N is equal to area dgeN PN·. On 
the other hand, the producer surplus of contract C is the domain bounded by 
Ohec Pc' . The magnitude of these areas depends on parameters. This is the first 
reason why the entrepreneur's choice of financial contract is not always desirable 
for consumers. Moreover, in contract N, there is the benefit from interest payments 
saved through the use of personal funds. Tbis term is positive, and hence the 
entrepreneur tends to prefer contract N.' This is the second reason why the 
entrepreneur's choice of financial contract is not always desirable for consumers. 
Now, we' define welfare. In our model, financial institutions earn zero expected 
profits due to perfect competition in the financial market. Therefore, the social 
welfare is composed of the consumer surplus and the profits of entrepreneur, i.e., 
W; = CS; +!T; . Moreover, we define the difference between the social welfare of each 
type of financial contract as 
, Ir·· ] H=WN-WC =-l(xN )-(xc) +G. 2 (26) 
Thus, if H> 0 (H < 0) holds, contract N (contract C) is aS,sociated with greater 
social welfare in the monopolistic market. 
'We have done our analysis under unrestricted capital intensity u. In our model, 
however, the first order condition (20) cannot be explicitly solved with general 
1 ' 
u E (0,1). Here, we provide an example by assuming u = -. In the case, from (19) 
3 
8 From (17) and (21), the producer surplus of contract N is 
• (1-(1-p)bN )"WI-O" • j ~ 2 PSN = p·XN 1-0" XN =!TN -- = (XN ) , which is the first term on puO"(1-u) p 
the R.H.S. of (25). On the oth~r hand, from (17) and (22), the producer surplus of 
contract C is 
• w u • - • • 1-0" W CT * - • 
( )
1-0" 1 ( ()I-O" I-O"J 
PSc=p·xc - j (xc Y =!Tc = Xc +---;:-(1+rc)j (xc) 0" (xc ),which 
is the second term of (25). 
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and (20), we have equilibrium outputs of each financial contract 
them into (25) and (26) respectively and substituting (J' =.!. into (24), we have 
3 
figure 5, where other parameters are set as w = f = 1 and bN = 0.8. Since (25) 
denotes the entrepreneur's choice of financial contract, the upper (lower) region of 
(25) represents contract N (contract C) occurs in equilibrium. The upper region of 
(24) and (26) are that contract N (contract C) is desirable for consumers and the 
society respectively. This figure implies that large risk from demand shock (small 
p) leads to the advantage of contract C because (24), (25), and (26) are 
downward-sloping. The reason is why high risk for lending requires large risk 
premium (large rN ) and then it leads to high marginal cost for production. On the 
other hand, if the entrepreneur increases the scale of production under contract C, 
the distortion on factor inputs expands. Therefore, the large market size (large a) 
increases the advantage of contract N. In. addition, (25) does not coincide (24) and 
(26). This implies that the entrepreneur's decision of financial contract is not always 
desirable for consumers as mentioned in proposition 4. In the region bounded by 
(24) and (25), the entrepreneur's choice of financial contract is not desirable for 
consumers. Moreover, in the region bounded by (25) and (26), the entrepreneur's 
decision does not maximize the second best social welfare. 
6 Summaries 
We have analyzed secured and unsecured loans through the financing activities of 
an entrepreneur who faces the risk of a demand shock. If h~ chooses the secured 
loan by collateralizing the capital good component of his production, he enjoys low 
interest payment but faces the borrowing constraint. If he closes the unsecured 
contract, he can borrow larger funds, but he must bear high interest payment. 
Through his cost minimization problem, the choice of financial contracts changes 
the marginal costs of production. The entrepreneur's choice of financial loan, 
therefore, has a significant effect on the output market and the social welfare. 
Moreover, we show that the product technology, wage rate, frictions of financial 
transaction, size of output market, and risk from demand shock affect the 
entrepreneur's choice of financial contract. An entrepreneur entering in a large 
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market prefers unsecured loan while he faced large risk selects secured loan. Finally, 
we show the case that the entrepreneur's choice of financial loan is detrimental 
to the social welfare. 
Appendix 
Appendix A: Cost Function with Oc < 1 
In this appendix, we derive the cost function of contract C when Oc < 1. From (4) 
and (5), theborrowing constraint (10) is replaced to 
(1- 0c)kc + wlc ~ f . (A.I) 
In the case, the cost minimization problem is following; 
min{kc +wlc - f} 
kc.lc 
k ul J-u sl. Xc = c c 
(1-oc)kc +w·lc ~ f 
which is illustrated by figure A. If the borrowing constraint (A. 1) is not binding, 
from the production function (2),the total cost (9), and rc = 1, the optimal 
capital-labor ratio is given by the ray OS; kc =~w. At point S, k=-(5-f 
. Ie 1- (5 1-0(5 
and 1= 1- (5 f hold. Substituting them into (2), the threshold production level 
1-5(5 w ... . 
for binding borrowing constraint (A. 1) is given as follows; 
(A.2) 
) 
If X ~ xc' the cost function is same as (11). On the other hand, if x> xc' the 
borrowing constraint is binding. The production is done on the range between Sand 
T. Point T is the upper limit of production scale under contract C; the entrepreneur 
cannot achieve production scales more than Xc under contract C. 
(Figure Ais around here') 
Now, we consider the cost function if Xc < x < Xc while it cannot be derived 
explicitly. By totally differentiating (2) and (A. 1), we have 
·[ak -(J-u)Z J-u 
c c 
l- oc 
(1- (5)k/lc -U][dkc] = [1] [0] [ 0] . dxc + df + doc· 
w die 0 . 1 kc 
(A. 3) 
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We define the determinant as ~. On the range between Sand T in figure A, we 
have - dkc - xZc - 0' I~. <~ which is the slope of (A.l). Therefore, we 
die Xkc (1-O')kc 1-5c ' 
have 
From (A. 3) and (A A) , we have 
die 
df 
ok -(1-0")1 1-0" 
e e >0 
~ 
(AA) 
(1- O')ke 1+0" Ie -0" < 0 
~ 
ok CFl I-CF 
e e > O. Because TCe = kc +w1c - f, we have marginal cost of ~ 
contract C as 
8(TCc ) = dkc +w die = w5c > o. 
axe dxe dxe ~ 
(A. 5) 
Therefore, we can conclude that the assumption of 5c = 1 in section 2 does not lead 
to qualitative difference result from the general case of 5 c ::; 1 except the existence 
of the upper limit of production scale xc' Here, we provide an example when 




f W 2 
---x + 
2(1-5c ) 1-5c 
(A. 6) 
Appendix B: Proof of Proposition 1 
First of ail, we show that (13) and (16) have an intersection of X. We define the 
difference between (13) and (16) as 
1-0" 
F(x)=TC -TC = (1-(1-p)5N )O"WI-0" x _f _(w)-;-(X )~. (B.l) 
NCO" (1 )1-0" N f C pO' -0' P 




F"(X)=_I:~(;)~ Xl-~o- <0, (B.3) 
F(O)=-(I+rN)j<O, and F(oo)=F'(oo)=-oo due to l'Hospital's Rule. Thus, 
F(x) is a concave function with a unique maximum point, whicp. is defined as x. 
Calculating F'(x) = 0 we have 
x = (l)l~o- (1-(i - P)ON )1~~(~)0-(1 +rN)I~o- { ,which is, of course, the same as 
p 1-(J l+rc w 0-
(24). Moreover, we have F'(x) ~ ~[C -(1 ~P)ON t· -I] > 0 and Xc <x 
Therefore, there exists x for which F(;) = 0 and x <;. The cost function (17) is 
illustrated as Figure 2. 
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Figure 1 : Profits of the Entrepreneur and the Order of Events 
The financial The probability variable A is 
institution sets up decided. IfA=O, the financial The firm pays 
interest rate rN of institution seizes capital goods. If back the debt. 
contract N. A=a, the production is continued. 
The entrepreneur sets up his The production 
firm by borrowing operating completes. The firm sells 
funds.· He purchases capital the products and obtains 
goods and employs labor. revenues. 
\V t \V t \V 
Choice of contract N. 
Choice of contract C. 
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